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The dispute over profitability, 
the transformation of the 
accumulation regime and the 
imperialist desperation
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Untenable inflation of the balances
From the 37 
million 
companies 
registered in 
Orbis 2007, only 
43060 TN control 
the fundamental 
and are 
interconnected 
by property 
relations. Among 
them, 1318 
control over the 
60% of total sales 
and only 17 the 
40%.
World power oligarquic concentration, 2007
The Anatomy of Global Corporate 
Ownership Network
A subgraph layout of focusing on a few major TNC’s in the financial sector; some 
of the many circles are highlighted.
The biggest 50 among the 147
• 1. Barclays plc
2.Capital Group Companies Inc
3.FMR Corporation
4.AXA
5.State Street Corporation
6.JP Morgan Chase & Co
7.Legal & General Group plc
8.Vanguard Group Inc
9.UBS AG
10.Merrill Lynch & Co Inc
11.Wellington Management Co
LLP
12.Deutsche Bank AG
13.Franklin Resources Inc
14.Credit Suisse Group
15.Walton Enterprises LLC
16.Bank of New York Mellon
Corp
17.Natixis
18.Goldman Sachs Group Inc
19.T Rowe Price Group Inc
20.Legg Mason Inc
21.Morgan Stanley
22.Mitsubishi UFJ Financial
Group Inc
23.Northern Trust Corporation
24.Société Générale
25.Bank of America
Corporation
• 26. Lloyds TSB Group plc
27.Invesco plc
28.Allianz SE 29. TIAA
30.Old Mutual Public Limited
Company
31.Aviva plc
32.Schroders plc
33.Dodge & Cox
34.Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc*
35.Sun Life Financial Inc
36.Standard Life plc
37.CNCE
38.Nomura Holdings Inc
39.The Depository Trust Company
40.Massachusetts Mutual Life
Insurance
41.ING Groep NV
42.Brandes Investment Partners LP
43.Unicredito Italiano SPA
44.Deposit Insurance Corporation
of Japan
45.Vereniging Aegon
46.BNP Paribas
47.Affiliated Managers Group Inc
48.Resona Holdings Inc
49.Capital Group International Inc
50.China Petrochemical Group
Company
Sanders Report (US Senate):
16 trillion dollars in FED bail out from 12.07 to
07.10
• Citigroup: ($2,500,000,000,000)
• Morgan Stanley:
($2,040,000,000,000)
• Merrill Lynch: ($1,949,000,000,000)
• Bank of America:
($1,344,000,000,000)
• Barclays PLC (United
Kingdom):
($868,000,000,000)
• Bear Sterns: ($853,000,000,000)
• Goldman Sachs:
($814,000,000,000)
• Royal Bank of Scotland (UK):
($541,000,000,000)
• JP Morgan Chase:
($391,000,000,000)
• Deutsche Bank
(Germany):
($354,000,000,000)
• UBS (Switzerland): 
($287,000,000,000)
• Credit Suisse (Switzerland):
($262,000,000,000)
• Lehman Brothers: ($183,000,000,000)
• Bank of Scotland (United
Kingdom): ($181,000,000,000)
• BNP Paribas (France):
($175,000,000,000)
• Wells Fargo & Co. ($159,000,000,000)
• Dexia SA (Belgium) )
($159,000,000,000)
• Wachovia Corporation
($142,000,000,000)
• Dresdner Bank AG
(Germany) 
($135,000,000,000)
• Societe Generale SA
(France)
($124,000,000,000)
• All the rest ($ 2,639,000,000,000)
• Total ($ 16.115.000.000.000)
SHADOW BANKING AS % GDP
PRIVATE CREDIT AS % GDP
Macroeconomic 
asymmetries, commercial 
struggle and 
monopolization
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Volcker Shock of 1979
VOLCKER SHOCK
Source: Gerard Duminil and Dominique Levy
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Transferencianetasobreladeudaexternapúblicade
losPEDentre1970y2008(enmilesdemillonesde
dólares)
US$ Billions
Source: World Bank
- 774.000 US$ BILLIONS
(1985-2008)
4,2 TRILLONS US$
(1987-2008)
Net transfers in debt service
from the global South
Profit rates recovery based on net transfers 
from the South (trade, FDI, interests and 
dividends)
Figura 7. Razão entre os fluxos totais de renda recebidos do resto do mundo e os lucros domésticos nos EUA (depois de impostos).
A renda disponível é a renda total depois de pagar os impostos. A poupança é o excesso da renda disponível sobre o total de todos os gastos em
bens e serviços, e o pagamento dos juros.
Fonte: NIPA (BEA).
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Fuente: BANCO MUNDIAL (2009)
The boom in commodities market has ended. The recent
commodities boom was the most significant lenghty
since 1900. 
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Historical matrix of dependency and specificities of 
Neoliberalism and financiarization in Latinamerica
Significant reduction in the rate of investment
(physical, “natural” and “human” capital)
RÉGIMEN DE ACUMULACIÓN BASADO EN LA INDUSTRIALIZACIÓN 
SUSTITUTIVA DE IMPORTACIONES
Fuente: CEPAL (2008)
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NEOLIBERAL 
2008ª= Proyectada
De-industrialization, job precarization and increasing
social polarization
Fuente: CEPAL (2008)
2008b/= Proyectadas
…with a 15% increase in the number of indigents…  
Fuente: CEPAL (2008)
2008b/= Proyectadas
…and 34% growth in the amount of poor people…
Fuente: CEPAL (2008)
2008b/= Proyectadas
Some mitigation with the progressive
governments
Fuente: CEPAL (2008)
2008b/= Proyectadas
Poorest performance even in their own terms...
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...with higher levels of vulnerabilities
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More dependent from the ineternational markets
Terms of trade 1900-2008
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